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THE USE OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
OF OPINION TO IMPEACH:
OHIO'S POSITION
A WITNESS IS called on behalf of the plaintiff and testifies as to facts
tending to establish the negligence of the defendant. On cross-examina-
tion the defendant offers to show that immediately following the accident
the witness stated to bystanders that the accident "was not the defendant's
fault." The plaintiff immediately objects. Is the prior statement of opinion
properly admitted?
In most states this prior inconsistent statement of opinion would be
admitted for the purpose of impeachment.' In Ohio2 and a few other states"
it would not be.
Until Wigmore wrote his treatise on evidence in 1904,' the courts
were nearly unanimous in excluding prior inconsistent statements of opinion.5
The prominent reason given for excluding these opinions is that they con-
flicted with the opinion rule.' This rationale has lead to exclusion of in-
consistent statements of opinion for all the numerous reasons associated with
the opinion rule."
The purpose of this article is to examine prior inconsistent statements
of opinion and point out why their exclusion, when offered to impeach, is
improper. Ohio's three leading cases on this point will serve to exemplify
the improper characterization and exclusion of these statements.
2 See J. WIoMo1E, EVIDENCE, § 1041 (3d ed. 1970); C. MCCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE, § 35 (2d
ed. 1972); Grady, The Admissability of a Prior Statement of Opinion for Purposes of Im-
peachment, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 224 (1956).2 See Cottom v. Klein, 123 Ohio St. 440, 175 N.E. 689 (1931); Schneiderman v. Sesanstein,
121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929); Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253
N.E.2d 804 (1969). Contra; Behrens v. Warrick, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 437 (Ct. App. 1940);
Jandroziejowski v. Burghardt, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 6 (Ct. App. 1934).
- Hirsh v. Manley, 81 Ariz. 94, 300 P.2d 588 (1956); Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840,
20 S.W.2d 684 (1929); State v. Thompson, 71 S.D. 319, 24 N.W.2d 10 (1946); McDougal
v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. 179, 194 S.W. 944 (1917); Webb v. City of Seattle, 22 Wash.
2d 596, 157 P.2d 312 (1945).
' 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1041 (1st ed. 1904).
5 See the excellent treatment of this early history in Grady, supra note 1, at 225-230.
6 See McCoRNUcK, supra note 1, at § 35. As will be examined later in this article, see text
accompanying notes 8-10, supra, Ohio still appears to take this position. See note 2, supra.
The opinion rule as it developed in the 19th century was a rule excluding lay opinion
testimony and requiring the witness to testify as to facts. McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at §
11. In more recent times this distinction between fact and opinion has been recognized as
a difference in degree only; all human expression contains to a greater or lesser degree. Id.
The modern approach has been to follow Wigmore's lead and regard the opinion rule as a
rule of trial practice allowing testimony in opinion form when convenience is served thereby,
and excluding it when it is superfluous. Id.; FED. R. EvID. § 704. Corollaries of the opinion
rule are that witnesses should not give opinions on the ultimate fact in issue, see e.g., Note
20, U. CiN. L. REv. 484 (1951), or on matters of law. McCoRMicK, supra, note 1, at § 12.
7 See e.g., Cottom v. Klein, 123 Ohio St. 440, 175 N.E. 689 (1931).
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I. THE OHIO VIEW: EXCLUSION OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
OF OPINION
On the basis of two supreme court cases,8 and one court of appeals
case,9 Ohio has been recognized as one of the few states that still excludes
prior inconsistent statements of opinion offered to impeach."0 The first of
these cases is Schneiderman v. Sesanstein," decided in 1929. Schneiderman
concerned an automobile-pedestrian accident. Schneiderman, the 10-year
old plaintiff, was struck and injured by the defendant's automobile. At trial
the defendant produced a witness who testified as to the speed at which the
defendant's automobile was traveling. On cross-examination the plaintiff's
counsel asked the witness whether he had previously made statements to
counsel that the accident had been defendant's fault. The trial court, upon
the defendant's objection, prevented the witness from replying. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of Ohio the court affirmed the trial court's ruling,
stating in its syllabus: "A witness who testifies as to facts cannot be dis-
credited by evidence of the expression of an opinion relative to the merits
of the case."' 2 Elaborating in the body of the opinion the court went on
to state:
A mere conclusion or opinion of the witness was sought, which was
not competent either upon direct or cross-examination. An inquiry is
incompetent which seeks the opinion of the witness upon the ultimate
question involved in the case, in this instance the very issue to be sub-
mitted to and determined by the jury."'
The second supreme court case was decided three years later. It too
involved an automobile-pedestrian accident. In Cottom v. Klein," the
plaintiff, a young child, was injured when she broke from her brother's
grip and ran across the street in front of the defendant's automobile. One
of the witnesses for the plaintiff was the father of the injured child. Over
objection, he was asked whether he had made a statement after the accident
to the defendant and his wife that "there had been an accident, . . . it was not
your husband's fault, it was the child's fault, she jerked away from me and
8 Id.; Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
9 Dorsten v. Laurence, 20 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253 N.E.2d 804 (1969).
10 See, MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 35 n. 31; 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1041 n.
2; Grady, supra note 1, at n.33.
11 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158 (1929).
12 Id.
Is 121 Ohio St. at 91, 167 N.E. at 161. As authority for this proposition the court went on
to cite 40 Cyc. 712:
A witness who gives opinion evidence may be discredited by showing that he has
expressed an opinion inconsistent with that expressed by him on the stand; but a witness
who testifies as to facts cannot be discredited by a showing of prior expression of
opinion by him, even though such expressions tend to contradict the inference which
might be drawn from his recital of facts, or are wholly inconsistent with the facts
testified to. Id.
"4 123 Ohio St. 440, 175 N.E. 689 (1931).
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ran in front of the car."' 5 The father denied making the statement. The de-
fendant husband and his wife when called to the stand testified that he had
made the statement. The supreme court reversed the trial court stating:
The ultimate question to be decided was, Who was negligent or at
fault? That was a question of fact to be determined by the jury, and
should be determined, not by the conclusion or by the opinion of the
witness, but by testimony detailing facts and circumstances from which
the jury could determine the issue of negligence."8
Finally, there is the more recent court of appeals case, Dorsten v.
Lawrence." In Dorsten, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant
for injuries arising out of an intersectional collision. At trial, the plaintiff's
chief witness testified that the defendant ran a red light. 8 On cross-exami-
nation, the court permitted the defendant to impeach this witness by an
alleged inconsistent statement of opinion to the effect that the plaintiff
was at fault.' 9 Holding the admission of this statement improper, the court
stated:
A witness who testifies as to fact cannot be discredited by evidence
of the expression of an opinion relative to the merits of the case.
Schneiderman v. Sesanstein... The declaration of an eyewitness, who
was not a party to the suit, that the accident was caused by the fault
of one of the parties, is but an expression of an opinion on an ultimate
issue to be determined by the jury, and is not competent, either as
origiral or impeaching evidence, and because of its prejudicial char-
acter its admission for the purpose of impeaching the witness constituted
reversable error. Cottom v. Klein... 20
As a result of these three cases, Ohio is among the minority of states
excluding prior inconsistent statements of opinion offered to impeach."' It
is tendered that Ohio's approach is mistaken.
II. WHY PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS OF OPINION
SHOULD BE ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH
Logic and consistency are ideally at the heart of the law. Ohio's approach
to prior inconsistent statements of opinion conform to neither. What follows
is an argument to persuade a court that Ohio's course is untenable and ought
not be followed.
To understand the nature of prior inconsistent statements of opinion,
'5 Id. at 444, 175 N.E. at 690.
16 Id.
720 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253 N.E.2d 804 (1969).
18 Id. at 299, 253 N.E.2d at 807.
19 Id. at 304, 253 N.E.2d at 809.
20 Id. at 304, 253 N.E.2d at 809 (citations omitted).
21 See note 7, supra.
[Vol. 13:1
3
Milligan: Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements of Opinion to Impeach
Published by Id aExchange@UAkron, 1980
Summer, 1979]
it is necessary to examine the larger genre of which they are a part: prior
inconsistent statements.
Prior inconsistent statements have always been admissible to impeach
a witness." The statements, if inconsistent, are relevant to aid the iury in
determining the credibility of a witness' testimony.2" Of course, the stateme:,t:,
made outside the courtroom are not hearsay; they are not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted." Hence, testimonial infirmities causing hearsay
concern are not present. Where the proper foundation has been laid, only
two objections can normally be raised to admitting the prior statements:
(1) they are not inconsistent with the trial testimony 5 and (2) they concern
a collateral issue.20
As to the first objection, the absence of an inconsistency renders the
statement irrelevant for impeachment purposes. Where there is no incon-
sistency, there can be no impeachment; the statement is clearly being offered
for the truth of the matter asserted and runs afoul of the hearsay rule.2T
There would appear to be few other purposes for which the statement is
offered.
The degree of inconsistency required to allow the statement in is a
matter of disagreement between jurisdictions. 8 Wigmore states the general
rule:
[T]here must of course be a real inconsistency between the two assert-
ions of the witness. The purpose is to induce the tribunal to discard the
one statement because the witness has also made another statement
which cannot at the same time be true ... Thus it is not mere difference
of statement that suffices; nor yet is an absolute oppositeness essential;
it is an inconsistency that is required.
Such is the possible variety of statement that it is often difficult to
determine whether this inconsistency exists. But it must appear 'prima
facie' before the impeaching declaration can be introduced. As a
general principle, it is to be understood that this inconsistency is to
22 See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1, at §§ 1017-46; McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 341.
23 Id.
24 See e.g., Fitzgerald v. Graham, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 20 (Ct. App. 1929); Dilcher v. State, 39
Ohio St. 130 (1883); Green v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 337 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1964)
(interpreting Ohio law).
2 5 See, e.g., State v. Clay, 29 Ohio App. 2d 206, 280 N.E.2d 385 (1972) aff.; 34 Ohio St.
2d, 250, 298 N.E.2d 137 (1973); Shadwick v. Hills, 79 Ohio App. 143, 69 N.E.2d 197 (1946);
WiGMORE, supra note 1, at §§ 1040-43; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 34; Dec. Dig. Wit-
nesses, Key No. 386.
2 6 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 581 (Ct. App. 1931); 3A WIOMORE, supra note
1, at § 1023; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 36; Dec. Digest, Witnesses, Key No. 383.
27 See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 34.
A strong case can be made for an exception to the hearsay rule allowing these statements
to be admitted on the merits. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 251; Fgn, R, Evm. § 801(d)(2),
98 See, McCoaMsCK, supra note 1, at § 34,
COMMENT
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be determined not by individual words or phrases alone, but by the
whole impression or effect of what has been said or done. On a com-
parison of two utterances, are they in effect inconsistent? Do the two
expressions appear to have been produced by inconsistent beliefs?2"
Although courts disagree on the degree of inconsistency required,"0
all courts recognize that to justify their use to impeach, the statement must
lend itself to an interpretation that casts doubt on the witness' credibility."
The second ground of objection, the collateral nature of the statement,
arises from considerations of time.' To allow impeachment on any fact
would tend to confuse the jury and use unnecessary amounts of the court's
time. Thus, the rule has been recognized that on collateral matters the cross-
examiner must take the witness' answer as given; the party cannot bring
in others to contradict it.3 3 Only the witness can contradict himself.
Prior inconsistent statements of opinion are but a species of this same
category of evidence. The failure of some courts to recognize this is at the
heart of the minority viewpoint leading to exclusion. 4 That these statements
are but a sub-category of the larger category of inconsistent statements is
apparent from the purpose for which they are both offered. Like prior
inconsistent statements of fact, prior inconsistent statements of opinion are
introduced to impugn the credibility of the witness. The statement of opin-
ion, like that of fact, is not offered as testimony on the merits. 5 The only
distinction between the two statements is the form which they take. " The
couching of a statement of fact in the form of an opinion does not logically
transform that statemeni, when offered to impeach, into testimony. Most
courts recognize this and admit the statement.3 7
Those that don't admit the statement are looking first at the form in
which the opinion is couched rather than the nature of the statement itself
and why it is being offered. The opinion rule is held applicable to the
statement although the statement is not offered in its opinion aspect. The
proper analysis is that the opinion is being offered for the inconsistent as-
sertion of fact that can be implied from the opinion expressed. It is this
inconsistent assertion of fact, not opinion, that is being offered to question
the credibility of the witness' testimony.
29 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1040.
8Old.
31 Id. at § 1018.
2 See, e.g., 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1023; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 36.
83 See, e.g., Clinton v. State, 33 Ohio St. 27 (1877); Omo JuR. 2d, Witnesses, § 393 (1963).
34 See generally, Grady, supra note 1.
85 See text accompanying note 32, infra.
6 Indeed, the title of McCormick's section on this matter is "Prior Inconsistent Statements:
Opinion in Form." MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 35.
V See cases cited in 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1041 n.2.
[Vol. 13:1
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These two observations for admission of inconsistent statements of
opinion are succinctly expressed by Wigmore:
The usual answer of some courts is that the declaration should be
excluded because it is mere opinion . . . This is unsound, (1) because
the declaration is not offered as testimony . . , and therefore the
opinion rule has no application, and (2) because the declaration in
its opinion aspect is not concerned, and is of importance only so far
as it contains by implication some contradictory assertion of fact.
In short, the only proper inquiry can be, Is there within the broad
statement of opinion on the general question some implied assertion
of fact inconsistent with the other assertion made on the stand? If there
is, it ought to be received, whether or not it is clothed in or associated
with an expression of opinion."8
The opinion rule is a recognition of the common law preference for
witnesses testifying in the form of "facts" and not "opinions."3 9 Although
this distinction is dubious4 - being more a distinction between varying
levels of generality - these are the terms in which the courts apply the rule.
As Wigmore recognized, the rule is nothing more than the exclusion of
superfluous evidence; the expressing of opinion on facts testified to adds
nothing to the proceeding since the jury already has the experience to draw
conclusions from the facts presented."
In Wigmore's words the rule "simply endeavors to save time and avoid
confusing testimony by telling the witness: 'The tribunal is in possession of
the same materials of information on this subject as yourself; thus, as
you can add nothing to our materials for judgment, your further testimony
(opinion) is unnecessary, and merely cumbers the proceedings.' "42 Hence,
the opinion rule is primarily a rule governing courtroom practice. As applied
to out-of-court statements the rule transcends its reason. An out-of-court
88ld. at § 1041.
89See 7 WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1919; MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at § 11; Note, Opin-
ion Testimony "Invading the Province of the Jury," 20 U. CIN. L. REV. 484 (1951);
Fed. R. Evid. 701.
401 d. Wigmore identifies the fallacy of such a distinction:
(a) . . . no such distinction is scientifically possible . . .
(b) . . . an examination of the so-called opinion rule, as applied in its various in-
stances, shows that the opinion element is, in the very law itself, a merely superficial
and casual mark and not the essential feature. On the one hand, that which is excluded
is not always "opinion" (in the sense of "inference from observed data" or in any other
sense), but may be "fact" ... On the other hand, that which is admitted is not always
"fact" but often "opinion."
7 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1919 (1940) (emphasis in original).
41 Id. at § 1917-18. Wigmore puts it thus:
wherever inferences and conclusions can be drawn by the jury as well as by the witness,
the witness is superfluous; and that thus an expert's opinion is received because and
whenever his skill is greater than the jury's, while a law opinion is received because and
whenever his facts cannot be so told as to make the jury as able as he to draw the
inference.
Id. at § 1917 (emphasis in original).
,2Id. at § 1918.
COMMENTSummer, 1979]
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opinion introduced to impeach is non-testimonial. The proponent is not
asking the trier of fact to believe the matter asserted, but is rather requesting
that the trier of fact make certain circumstantial inferences regarding the
witnesses' credibility.
A secondary, less important reason for the opinion rule is to improve
the objectivity and reliability of testimonial assertions. " By requiring counsel
to question specifically, and the witness to respond likewise, faulty gener-
alizations and conclusions are left for the jury to make. The purpose of the
opinion rule is, then, twofold: to aid trial administration by reducing wasted
time and to increase the reliability and objectivity of testimony.
Neither purpose is served by excluding prior inconsistent statements
of opinion used to impeach. Prior inconsistent statements of opinion are
out-of-court utterances. As we have seen," the opinion rule is primarily a
rule governing courtroom proceedings. Unlike courtroom testimony, out-
of-court statements of opinion cannot be reformulated to comply with the
opinion rule. They must either be accepted or rejected as they are. To
exclude these prior inconsistent statements merely because they happen to
be in opinion form is unfortunate since they will often aid the jury in
assessing the credibility of a witness. While opinions are not the preferred
form of evidence, they are preferable to having no evidence at all.
Unfortunately, the incorporation of the opinion rule restraints into
the area of prior inconsistent statements has resulted in this exclusion of
probative evidence. Logic compels a different result.
Ohio admits out-of-court statements of opinion in other contexts where
the reasons for so doing are even less compelling than in the instance of
prior inconsistent statements of opinion.
Most noteworthy in this respect is Ohio's clear position excepting
admissions of a party-opponent that are in the form of an opinion from the
operation of the hearsay rule." Dorsten while stating that prior inconsistent
statements of opinion are admissible, made a curious reference to the
existence of this apparently contradictory position:
The rule that a witness who is not a party cannot be impeached by
his prior statement expressing an opinion about the fault of one of the
parties is not to be confused with the rule which permits introduction
into evidence of an admission against interest made by a party to the
4 3 McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 11.
44 See text accompanying notes 33-36, supra.
45 See Faxon Hills Construction Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, 168 Ohio St. 8, 151 N.E.2d 12 (1958); Freas v. Sullivan, 130 Ohio St. 486, 200
N.E. 639 (1936); Ferrebee v. Boggs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 18, 263 N.E.2d 574 (1970); Eakins
v. Nash, 118 Ohio App. 280, 194 N.E.2d 148 (1963); Kaczmarek v. Murphy, 78 Ohio App.
449, 70 N.E.2d 784 (1946).
[Vol. 13:1
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case where such admission concerns an opinion or conclusion as to
his fault...
Such admission against interest by a party is admissible as substantive
proof on the issues, without any need of testimony from the party making
such admission. It may serve a secondary purpose of impeaching the
party making such admission if he testifies."6
The reasons for making the distinction, other than fortuitous historical
developments, is not apparent. In fact, the rationale for admitting opinions
as admissions is much less compelling than that present for prior inconsistent
statements of opinion; admissions, opinion in form, are being admitted
as substantive evidence,17 prior inconsistent statements, opinion in form,
are being admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment. It would
appear that the "dangers" acknowledged by the opinion rule are more
prevalent in the former and not the latter. This is true particularly in light
of the limiting instruction to be given by the court in the instance of im-
peachment by prior inconsistent statements of opinion.
The similarity between the two areas is striking. As both Wigmore
and McCormick point out, the admissions exception to the hearsay rule is
justifiable by the circumstantial value of the prior statement arising from
its inconsistency with the present claim." As we have seen, ' inconsistency
is at the heart of admitting prior statements to impeach. Why then should
the distinction be made as to statements opinion in form? Perhaps the only
answer that can be given is that Schneiderman and Cottom are quirks in
Ohio's law of evidence.
The extent to which this is true can be seen by examining the numerous
Ohio opinions allowing admissions, opinion in form, to be used as sub-
stantive evidence.
Ohio's approach can be traced back to the Supreme Court case of
Freas v. Sullivan.5" In Freas, the court upheld the admission of the defend-
ant, testified to by a witness: "Well, he [the defendant] said he had an
accident and he felt as though he would be responsible for it, it was his
fault."51 The court upheld the admission of this testimony stating in syllabus
number eight:
8. Admissions of an alleged tort-feasor, made two weeks after a col-
'
6 Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App. 2d at 304, 253 N.E.2d at 808-10 (emphasis in
original).
47 See note 39, supra.
48 4 WirMOmRE supra note 1, at § 1048 (1972); McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 262; See
also Eakins v. Nash, 118 Ohio App. at 282, 194 N.E.2d at 149.
4 9 See text accompanying notes 22-25, supra.
50 130 Ohio St. 486, 200 N.E. 639 (1936).
51 This language was not incorporated into the supreme court's opinion but was derived from
the record by a later court of appeals case. 78 Ohio App. at 454, 70 N.E.2d at 786.
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lision, relative to his individual responsibility in causing such col-
lision, are competent against such tort-feasor.5"
The same problem was presented in a later court of appeals case,
Eakins v. Nash 3 where the defendant testified as follows:
Q. Did you say anything to Mrs. Eakin after the accident?
A. Well I asked her if she was O.K.
Q. I don't mean that; I mean with reference to how the accident
happened?
A. You mean whose fault it was?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, it was my fault.
Q. And you said so to her didn't you?
A. Yes, I did.5'
In upholding the admission of this testimony, the court stated:
While admittedly the declaration, or even the sworn testimony, of
third parties on the ultimate issue of fact are improper, there is no
question that such admissions, when made by a party, are freely
admissible... The theory of admissibility is that it is inconsistent with
later denial of the claim. 55
Again, the court in Eakins, like the Dorsten court, stated the distinction be-
tween admissions, in the form of opinion, and prior statements used to
impeach, opinion in form.
The existence of these cases provides a powerful argument against
following the Schneiderman - Cottom view. The soundness of the view
taken by Freas and its progeny is unquestioned and supported by all the
commentators.5"
Toppling the view expressed by Schneiderman, Cottom and Dorsten
is aided by the weakness of the cases revealed upon close reading.
Both Schneiderman and Cottom involve circumstances which, even
under the modern majority view, would result in the exclusion of the
statements. The Schneiderman and Cottom courts both recognized that the
statements at issue were not inconsistent with the testimony given at trial.
As all the commentators recognize, this is a proper reason for excluding the
statement.57 Thus, in Schneiderman, although the statement is not set out
52 130 Ohio St. 486, 200 N.E. 639.
53 118 Ohio App. 280, 194 N.E.2d 148 (1963).
54Id. at 281, 194 N.E.2d at 149.
55 Id. at 282, 194 N.E.2d at 149.
5 6See, e.g., 4 WiUMoRE, supra note 1, at 1053 (1972); McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 264.
57 3A WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 1041; McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at § 35; Grady, supra
note 1, at 232-34.
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in the opinion, the court stated: "The statements which counsel's questions
assumed had been made by the witness were in no wise contradictory to
his testimony on direct examination, nor were they competent for the purpose
of impeachment.58 The lack of inconsistency is much more apparent in the
Cottom opinion wherein the reader is provided with the statement in issue.
In Cottom, it will be remembered, the plaintiff, a young child, was injured
when she broke from her brother's grip and ran across the street in front
of the defendant's automobile. At trial, the father, who was with the children
at the time of the accident, was called in behalf of the plaintiff and testified
as follows:
Q. She left loose of her brother's hand and went on ahead across the
street?
A. Yes.
Q. You were about the middle of the street when she left you and the
other children?
A. Practically so, yes.59
Upon cross-examination, the witness-father was asked whether he had made
a statement after the accident to 'the defendant and his wife that "there had
been an accident, . . . it was not your husband's fault, it was the child's
fault she jerked away from me, and ran in front of the car.""0 The plaintiff
denied making the statement; the husband and wife when called to the
stand testified that he had.
It is clear, then, that the prior statement was not inconsistent at all
with the trial testimony. Thus, as the court itself noted, it should not have
been admitted:
Cottom had not denied that the child had broken away from him.
That fact was admitted and not subject to impeachment, so the sole
purpose of this testimony was to impeach the credibility of the father
by showing that he had stated that the collision was not the defendant's
fault; but the fault of the child.6
It can thus be seen that the two Ohio Supreme Court cases on point
have an independent leg on which to stand that is not at odds with admitting
prior inconsistent statements of opinion. Perhaps the language con-
tained in Schneiderman and Cottom concerning the inadmissibility of prior
inconsistent statements of opinion may be viewed as dictum.
As for the more recent court of appeals case, Dorsten v. Lawrence,1
2
58 121 Ohio St. at 91, 167 N.E. at 161 (emphasis added).
59 123 Ohio St. at 443, 175 N.E. at 689.
60 Id. at 444, 175 N.E. at 690.
el Id.
02 20 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253 N.E.2d 804.
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it too can be analyzed so that its language supporting the view of not ad-
mitting prior inconsistent statements is dictum. Specifically, the court in
Dorsten made a point of stating that the inconsistent statement of opinion
had no independent basis of fact in the record. 3 It was only through coun-
sel's questioning that the statement was put before the jury; no subsequent
witness supported the contention that the statement had indeed been made:
The absence of such impeaching testimony from an impeaching witness,
or from some documentary evidence properly admitted, gives rise to
no proof that the witness, sought to be impeached, ever made the
contradictory or inconsistent statement; and, when this is followed at
the close of the evidence and final arguments to the jury by trial court's
general instructions to the jury, as it was in the present case, concerning
the rules pertaining to determining credibility and impeachment of
witnesses, the prejudicial nature of the error incident to attempted
impeachment of a witness is compounded and made much more
serious."
Schneiderman, Cottom, and Dorsten all rest on shaky ground with
regard to their views on excluding prior inconsistent statements of. opinion.
Logic and consistency demand that their views on prior inconsistent state-
ments of opinion be disregarded.
RICHARD MILLIGAN
53 id. at 305, 253 N.E.2d at 810.
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